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Dual identity and its mechanisms: national and European identity in the Italo-Slovene border area
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Abstract
Whilst rich and empirical research on compatibility between national and European identity furnishes contradictory results depending on the context (country, time) and the controlling variables (e.g. ideology), the statistical relationship between national and European identity can be positive or negative or even null. The study of dual identity still encounters a number of problems in terms of both theoretical conceptualization and empirical measurement. Several scholars have argued that it is necessary to focus the study of dual identities more closely in order to: 1) better conceptualize how national and European identity are connected in citizens’ minds 2) refine instruments to measure dual identity 3) draw hypotheses on the social and political consequences of dual identity.

This paper aims to contribute to this line of inquiry by referring to the Common Ingroup Identification Model (CIIM) and the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM), two different social-psychological models related to Social Identity Theory. According to CIIM identification with a common superordinate ingroup not require rejection of the pre-merger identity in favour of the new inclusive group identity. The resulting dual identity is associated to positive evaluation of all those seen as members of the same superordinate category. By contrast IPM questions the hypothesis that dual identity necessarily produces positive inter-groups relations. The underlying assumption of IPM is that: 1) a super-ordinate group (in this case Europe) provides norms for comparisons between subordinate national ingroup and outgroup; 2) if ingroup projection is triggered, members of a national group can discriminate outgroup, because they consider it a deviation from the ethnocentrically construed super-ordinate European prototype. The validity of the application of IPM to the analysis of the relationship between national and European identity has been demonstrated by experimental studies with small groups. The aim of the paper is to test the validity of CIIM/IPM in non-experimental design in order to study mechanisms underlying dual identity in a ‘real’ world. The empirical data used are taken from a survey conducted in 2008 in the Alpe Adria Euroregion. The sample is composed of two national groups in a cross-border region (the inhabitants of Trieste and Gorizia in Italy and the inhabitants of Goriska Obalno–Kraska in Slovenia).

Key words: National and European identity, Multiple identity, Ingroup Projection Model, Common Ingroup Identification
1. Theoretical framework

For a long time studies on the relationship between citizens and European Union has made no reference whatsoever to the role of national or European identities. The different levels of support for the European Union have been explained in terms of instrumental motivations (the expected benefits of European integration) or, following Inglehart’s approach, of the differing availability of cultural and economic resources to the individuals (Inglehart 1970; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1994). Important in these studies is the contrast between the support shown by the elite and the substantial lack of interest of the masses (the so-called ‘permissive consensus’, Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971). With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the first half of the 1990s, the approach changed (Gillespie and Laffan, 2006; Duchesne and Frognier, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2008). As public opinion surveys show, while support for European integration has spread also outside the restricted circle of the elite, the issue of the existence of an European identity has arisen (for an exhaustive and critical overview of the research on European identity in the context of EU governance see Kaina and Karolewski, 2013). This new interest stimulates questions on the relationship with the main collective identity of the modern age - the nation - (Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011: 10-12) and also translates into the construction of new indicators. Relevant in this regard is the introduction into Eurobarometer surveys of the so-called (and so-debated) ‘Moreno question’ which takes into account the possibility that the European and national identity may be mutually exclusive (Moreno, 2006).

A brief survey of empirical analyses carried out in the past fifteen years by socio-political scientists and social psychologists indubitably shows the gradual spread of the sense of belonging to Europe (Duchesne and Frognier, 1994, 2008; Hermann, Risse and Brewer 2004; Bruter, 2005), albeit in a frame of the substantial maintenance of national affiliations (Duchesne and Frognier, 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2008; Citrin and Sides, 2004; Herb and Kaplan, 1999). Not only have several instances of the existence of dual identities already been confirmed (where national identity and European identity are compatible in the perception of individuals), but also of the increase of mass support of European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Carey 2002). Nevertheless, the picture arising from this extensive and constant empirical
analysis is still incongruous. Based on a given period of time or country, the statistical relationship between the indicators of national identity and European identity can be positive or negative and, in some cases, even nil (Duchesne and Frognier, 2008). In order to resolve this contradiction, Hooghe and Marks suggest distinguishing between national attachment and exclusive national identity (as opposed to ‘inclusive’ identity) and taking account of the role of the political context (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2008). National identities influence attitudes towards Europe through political elites which can make them salient. From this perspective, the political competition would favour (or tackle) the conflict between national and European identity. Another explanation relates to the meanings associated with national identities. This concerns the typical (also widely debated) distinction between the ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ components of belonging (Bruter 2004; Haller and Ressler 2006), where the former is favourable ground for the inclusive forms of socio-territorial belonging, while the latter is associated with separation and exclusiveness. Another way to account for the national/European identities relationship is to consider the role of specific national cultures in ‘framing’ Europe (Diez Medrano, 2003).

Actually, the empirical confirmations are already numerous as to both the hypothesis of conflict between the two identities and the reverse. Duchesne and Frognier (2008:164) argue that continuing the dispute on what is the ‘true’ relationship between national and European identity cannot contribute to better understanding of the phenomenon. According to Duchesne and Frognier, the contradictory nature of the results is simply due to the complexity of the process of socio-territorial identification. This complexity requires a further theoretical effort to determine the mechanisms underlying the connections between national and European identity. In fact, although the study of dual identities has attracted much interest, it still encounters several problems in regard to both theoretical conceptualisation and empirical measurement. These problems are partly due to the association of a relatively new (and in fieri) political community such European polity with an ‘umbrella’ concept such as identity. Kaina and Karolewski in their very complete overview of the research on European identity in the political science literature have well stressed the fact that “ambiguity is not only a typical trait of this notion but also its greatest impairment when it comes to its usefulness as an analytical category” (Kaina and Karolewski, 2013:15). Brubaker and Cooper (2000) remark on the confusing and contradictory use of this term by stating that it occurs, in the scientific field, with at least three different meanings: 1) identification and categorisation; 2) self-understanding and social collocation; 3) community, social network.

Based on this distinction, in this paper I focus on European identity in terms of ‘identification’ with the European population. The paper thus refers to identity as a process, and to the well-known mechanism of group categorisation/identification/inter-group behaviour described by the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982) and the following Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 1987). The influence of the Social Identity Theory on the study of European identity is thus indisputable: some important empirical studies on this subject are more or less directly based on this theoretical model (Breakwell and Lyons 1996; Hermann, Risse and Brewer 2004; Bruter 2005), and so too are the main indicators used in sample surveys to assess national and European identifications.

In regard to multiple identities, social psychologists have drawn on the Social Identity Theory to propose four models which can account for the relationships between national identity and European identity (Risse, 2004: 249-252):

1. Nested identities: the national self is perceived as enclosed in the European one (the metaphor of the ‘Russian Matruska doll’);
2. Cross-cutting identities: other identities overlap with the national and the European ones, interfering with the relationship;
3. **Mixed identities**: European identity and national identity reciprocally influence each other (the metaphor of the ‘marble cake’);

4. **Separated identities**: belonging to the nation is not at all associated with belonging to Europe.

Studies on public opinion have furnished a variety of empirical evidence on some sort of association between national and European identity. Hence the separated identities model does not seem appropriate, whereas the available data are consistent with both the nested identities model and the cross-cutting identities one. The former model, for example, is in accordance with the correlation found among the different territorial levels of belonging (Risse 2003, 2004; Diez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Duchesne and Frognier 2008), whereas the latter is consistent with the political identity effect (ideology) in mediating the relationship between national and European identity (Hooghe and Marks 2004). However, it is difficult to find in the literature results confirming the validity of the mixed identities model. This may be due to the indicators available, which, overall, are not suitable for studying the possible ‘mingling’ between national and European self (Risse, 2004).

Finding empirical evidence for the existence of dual identities confirms the multiplicity of socio-territorial belongings in everyday subjective experience, but it says little about how national identity and European identity connect. Risse calls for research that specifies “the different ways in which the multiplicity of identities could be conceptualised, to draw from these alternative hypotheses and test them empirically” (ibid.: 253). The same call is made by Duchesne and Frognier (2008), although they stress the fact that the specificity of European and national identity resides in their being referred to ‘political’ communities; a specificity that would not be recognised if territorial identities were treated like the kind of social or professional identities. This argument is in accordance with Huddy’s (2001) contention that the Social Identity Theory is useful in studying political identity (like national and European identity) as long as to go beyond the “social identity theorists’ disinclination to examine the sources of social identity in a real world complicated by history and culture” (Huddy, 2001: 127).

According to Duchesne and Frognier (2008), the complexity of the socio-territorial identification process derives from its intrinsic duality: 1) “it assumes a natural tendency to identify with a group; 2) it implies the propensity to identify with the specific group defined by this specific territory” (ibid.: 154). Identification with a political community is the result, on the one hand, of an individual disposition to feel oneself member of a group, and on the other, of the social and political build-up of boundaries by that particular group. The two levels of belongingness are potentially ‘cumulative’ when the first type of process acts, and they are ‘competitive’ (because of manipulation by the elite that may present the two political communities as rivals) when the second type of process takes place (ibid.: 163-4). The former process is clearly a psychological one (“a variable disposition to identify with groups defined by territories”, ibid.: 156) and can be illustrated with both the metaphor of the ‘Russian doll’ and that of the ‘marble cake’. National identity constitutes, in this regard, an important resource for the construction of a European identity: “nations still appear to be a powerful vehicle for the development of such a tendency towards a we-feeling, which, in particular, can then be extended to other nested territories such as the European Union” (Duchesne and Frognier, 2008: 164, emphasis added).

The issue raised by Duchesne and Frognier is important, and the hypothesis that identification with the nation may ‘extend’ to Europe because of the (social and psychological) human disposition to identify with

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1 This latter process explains, for example, why the relationship between national and European identity is negative when the analysis is carried out on data related to periods of time in which the opinion of ‘Eurosceptics’ dominates the public debate and not in other periods of time (Duchesne and Frognier, 2008:156).
groups placed on different territorial scales warrants attention. But what are the mechanisms underlying this process of ‘extension’ of the we-feeling? In other words: it is established that national and European identities are compatible, but how do they connect to each other?

This paper aims to contribute to this line of inquiry by applying to survey data two different socio-psychological models: the Common Ingroup Identification Model (Gaertner et al., 1993, 2000) and the Ingroup Projection Model (Waldu et al., 2003, 2005; Mummenday and Waldus 2004; Wenzel et al. 2008).\(^2\) As we shall see, the mechanisms suggested exhibit two different ways to extend, at micro level, the ‘we-feeling’ from the nation to Europe. The application of these models to survey data makes it possible to demonstrate the complexity of the processes underlying dual identification. In particular, as will be seen, these models give two different answers to the question ”what does it mean to feel equally national and European?".

1.1. Socio-psychological mechanisms underlying dual identification

Both the Common Ingroup Identification Model and the Ingroup Projection Model allow conceptualization of the ‘Europe of nations’ in terms of ‘subgroups within one group’. From this perspective, dual identity is possible because Europeans can conceive their national groups as distinct units within a superordinate category defined by Europe. Although they have the same starting point, these models indicate two different mechanisms which explain how individuals can connect the national and European levels: re-categorisation (Common Ingroup Identification Model) and ingroup projection (Ingroup Projection Model).

According to the Common Ingroup Identification Model (CIIM)\(^3\), the re-categorisation of an individual’s ingroup and the outgroup from ‘us’ and ‘them’ to ‘we’ is present when members of separate groups (ingroup, outgroup) start to perceive each other as belonging to the same higher-level category (nested in each other). Re-categorisation does not require rejection of the pre-merger identity in favour of the new inclusive group identity. Rather, the resulting identity is of dual type: the new superordinate identity does not substitute the one of minor scope but co-exists with it (common ingroup identification). One of the main consequences of re-categorisation concerns inter-group relations: in fact, if re-categorisation is activated, discrimination towards the outgroup decreases because re-categorisation entails a positive evaluation of all those seen as members of the same superordinate category. If this is applied to the relationship between national and European identities, it is possible to predict from this model that dual identity will be associated with positive attitudes towards all the national groups members of Europe. However, this is the mainstream hypothesis among those committed to promoting the construction of a transnational political European community. But experiments carried out do not fully confirm the CIIM’s hypotheses, and, in some cases, dual identity is associated with discrimination towards the national groups members of Europe.

The alternative model (Ingroup Projection Model, IPM) explains this latter result by the activation of ingroup projection. This occurs when individuals project the distinctive features of the ingroup onto the superordinate category and reckon that the ingroup represents the superordinate category better than the outgroup (relative ingroup prototypicality). From the IPM’s perspective, the process consists of two phases: 1) inclusion: national identity is referred to a group perceived as included in the superordinate European

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\(^2\) Both models are related to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982) and Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner and al. 1987).

\(^3\) Henceforth, I shall refer to the Common Ingroup Identification Model as CIIM and to the Ingroup Projection Model as IPM.
category; 2) ingroup projection: the features of the national self are projected onto those of the European self (Mummendey and Waldzus, 2004: 63-64). To be noted is that this conceptualisation of dual identity theoretically validates both the metaphor of the Russian doll and that of the marble cake: “the ingroup projection assumes a combination within a nested design (Russian Matruska doll metaphor) and a mixed identity (marble cake’s metaphor)” (ibid.: 64). National identity, therefore, is subordinated to the European one (since it is included in the latter) but it may ‘blend’ with it due to the effect of the ingroup projection. If ingroup projection is triggered, members of the national ingroup may discriminate against the outgroup because they consider it a deviation from the ethnocentrically construed superordinate European prototype. Experimental studies that have activated comparisons between different groups of diverse nationalities belonging to Europe (e.g. German participants were asked to express opinions on Poles, Britons and Italians) have confirmed the validity of this hypothesis (Mummenday and Waldzus 2004; Waldzus et al. 2008). This ingroup projection process has been demonstrated both on self-report and indirect measures. In others studies this research is expanded to the visual level, specifically within the domain of faces (Imhoff et al, 2011). Mummenday and Waldzus (2004) proposed that ingroup projection is related with a simple representation of Europe. First evidence corroborates this model prediction, suggesting that a complex representation of Europe would improve more tolerance and more positive intergroup attitudes.

A motivation for a positive social identity seems to be at the core of the IPM. By contrast, Machunsky and Meiser (2009) have proposed a cognitive explanation of IPM: if a superordinate category is weakly defined, people can “infer characteristics from the next lower order entity (e.g. positive ingroup attributes) to characterize the superordinate category”(Bianchi et al, 2009: 961). Social psychologists have taken decidedly different positions on the underlying motivational and cognitive processes that activate the mechanism of ingroup projection rather than that of re-categorisation and their consequences on intergroup relations. However, these are issues that fall outside the scope of this paper. I shall refer to the main assumptions of these models in order to gain better understanding of how to connect, at micro level, national and European identity. The paper presents an application based on survey data of IPM/CIIM⁴ in order to take into account the historical and social complexity that affects people’s lives in a ‘real’ world. Finding that these two alternative ways to connect the national to the European level arise also outside the experimental setting could be particularly useful for going beyond the dispute on the compatibility or the conflict between national and European identity. In this regard, the most interesting aspect of the IPM/CIIM models is that they make it possible to go beyond a simplistic vision of dual identification, because it is valued the fact that including national ingroup in the wider category of ‘Europe’ is only one of the aspects involved in the process of dual identification (one may say, it is only the starting point).

2. Methodology and findings

2.1 Data

The analyses presented in this paper are based on data from telephone interviews conducted between 1 September and 15 October 2008 among a sample composed of two national groups in a cross-border region: the inhabitants of the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia in Italy and the inhabitants of the regions of Goriska Obalno–Kraska in Slovenia. The data were collected by the project "Identità, culture civiche e

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⁴ To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to apply IPM in public opinion studies to investigate the relationship between national and European identity. In general, very few authors have applied IPM in public opinion studies (see Minescu et al., 2008; Ng Tseung-Wong, and Verkuyten, 2010).
politiche a confronto. Una ricerca sull’Euroregio adriatica/ Identity, civic and political cultures compared. A research on Adriatic Euroregion” co-financed by the Community Initiative Programme INTERREG IIIA Italy-Slovenia, implemented in the framework of the Structural Funds for the 7-year programming period 2000-2006 (Segatti, 2009). The interviews were administered in the Italian and Slovenian languages. Table 1 shows the distribution by geographic areas of the samples, which were representative of the target national population by age, gender, and geographic area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trieste</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>Goriska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorizia</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>Obalno – Kraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The area in which the survey was conducted is particularly well suited to the study of the relationship between national and European identity in a ‘real’ world: that is, a social, historical, and political world. In fact, in this cross-border region the ‘merging process’ (whereby Italians and Slovenians are conceived as “subgroups within one European common ingroup”) is affected by time differences (Italy and Slovenia have become members of the same European ‘home’ at different times) and by former ‘thick’ political and social boundaries. As well known, in the past the border between Italy and Yugoslavia was a significant ethnic and political boundary. Slovenians became part of the Italian state, like the Germans of South Tyrol, the Croats in Istria, and the Italian-speaking population of what Italians call Venezia Giulia, after the First World War, as a consequence of the collapse of the former Habsburg Empire. As Germans and Croats, they were repressed by the fascism regime, which adopted a policy of radical assimilation. After the Second World War, Italy lost large part of Venezia Giulia. A few hundred thousands of Italians were ‘persuaded’ by the communist regime to move from Istria to Italy or elsewhere. A significant number of them settled in what remained of the inter-war Venezia Giulia – the Trieste and Gorizia provinces – intermixing with the resident Slovenian minority. The collective rights of the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian minority in Slovenia were legally protected by international treaty (the London Memorandum of 1954) and bilateral agreements stipulated initially between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Iron Curtain symbolized the ideological conflict and also the physical boundary dividing cities such as Gorizia/Goriska into two separate areas. After the end of the Cold War, cross-border cooperation evolved significantly over time, and since 1991 it has done so between Italy and Slovenia. The acquisition of EU member state status by the Republic of Slovenia in 2004 and the adoption of the euro in 2007 marked the opening of a new phase.

2.2 Empirical analyses

As said above, the main aim of this paper is to go beyond a simplistic vision of dual identity (national and European). The hypothesis tested is that, when individual ‘dual identifiers’ compare their national groups to Europe they use at least two different ways, based on different socio-psychological mechanisms (re-categorisation vs. ingroup projection), to connect the national and European levels. The empirical analysis proceeded as follows. First constructed was a typology able to describe the different ways in which the interviewees (Italian and Slovene) related their own and other national groups to the category of ‘Europeans’. In this way, it was possible to identify the types corresponding to the activation of the mechanisms of re-categorisation and ingroup projection, and to check whether they were present among interviewees who declared that they identified both with the nation and with Europe. Finally, two
logistic regression models were be conducted to control for the influence of antecedent variables on activation of ingroup projection rather than re-categorisation.

Adopted to construct the typology was a simplified version of the measures defined in the experimental studies with small groups. Two parameters were considered:

- the extent to which the national ingroup was perceived as a sort of prototype of the superordinate European category (ingroup prototypicality);
- the extent to which the superordinate European category was perceived as including, or otherwise, a national group different from that of the interviewee (a proxy for outgroup prototypicality).

Specifically, the typology of ways to connect ingroup, outgroup, common ingroup was constructed by combining the answers to following two items:

1. Some people think that Italians (for the Italian sample)/Slovenians (for the Slovenian sample) are typically European, others do not. In your opinion, to what extent can Italians/Slovenians be considered typically European? (rated on a 4-point Likert scale 1 ‘not at all’, 4 ‘very’);
2. In your opinion, would the exclusion of Slovenia (for the Italian sample)/Italy (for the Slovenian sample) from Europe be a serious loss? (rated on a 4-point Likert scale 1 ‘not at all’, 4 ‘very’)

The first question measured the degree of perceived ingroup prototypicality; this is a direct measure sometimes used in experimental design. The second one was a proxy for outgroup prototypicality. The resulting typology consisted of four types:

a) Inclusive common ingroup: the perception that the national ingroup is typically ‘European’ (very, quite) is associated with the opinion that the exclusion of the other national group from Europe would be a serious loss (very, quite).

b) Relative ingroup prototypicality: the perception that the national ingroup is typically European (very, quite) is associated with the opinion that the exclusion of the other national group from Europe would not be a serious loss (not at all, not very).

c) Relative outgroup prototypicality: the national ingroup is not considered typically European (not at all, not very), but the exclusion of the other national group from Europe would be considered a serious loss (very, quite);

d) Separate groups: the national ingroup is not considered typically European (not at all, not very) and the exclusion of the other national group from Europe would not be considered a serious loss (not at all, not very).

Table 2 shows the frequency of the four types in Slovenia and Italy. To be noted is that: 1) each type is nearly equally represented; 2) the distribution is similar in Italy and Slovenia.

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5 Asking group members how prototypical they think their ingroup and outgroup are for the superordinate category is the simplest and most direct measure used in experimental design (for advantages and disadvantages compared with more sophisticated and indirect measures see Wenzel et al, 2003; Ulrich, 2009). In these studies, the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality results from difference between ingroup prototypicality and outgroup prototypicality (a cardinal variable was obtained). To avoid social desirability concerns in survey design, it was decided to measure outgroup prototypicality with a different question (In your opinion, would exclusion of Slovenia/Italy from Europe be a serious loss?). It was assumed that there is a positive correlation between perceiving the outgroup as typically European and thinking that exclusion of the outgroup from Europe would be a serious loss. Moreover, in order better to identify the different ways to connect national and European level underlying dual identification, a typology was constructed in which the ‘relative ingroup prototypicality’ was only one of the possible types. Both variables were transformed, producing two dichotomous variables (not at all/not very vs. very, quite). Interviewees answering “don’t know” were excluded. Dichotomous variables were crossed to produce a typology with four levels.
Table 2. Distribution of the typology of ways to connect ingroup, outgroup and the European superordinate category (%; Italy, Slovenia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive common ingroup</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative ingroup prototypicality</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative outgroup prototypicality</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate groups</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be clear that, based on the theoretical framework outlined above, only the first two types are relevant to the aim of this paper. The last two types share the perception of difference between the national and European prototype; thus implying that the (possible) identities referred to those categories cannot be anything but separate from each other. By contrast, the first two types have in common the fact that the interviewees perceived a similarity between the national prototype and the superordinate European one; this is the minimal condition required to allow the development of dual identity. The ‘inclusive common ingroup’ type is consistent with the mechanism of re-categorisation. Instead, the ‘relative ingroup prototypicality’ type complies with the mechanism of ingroup projection. In fact, as shown in Table 3, the large majority of ‘dual identifiers’ adhered to those two models: 73% in Italy and 67% in Slovenia. Those who felt themselves to be both Italian/Slovenian and European6 were more likely to adhere to models based on ‘inclusive common ingroup’ (44% vs. 28% of the sample in Italy and 36% vs. 27% of the sample in Slovenia). This result is, not surprisingly, in accordance with the hypothesis of re-categorisation. The data also confirm the predictions of the IPM: both in Italy and Slovenia, the interviewees who identified with their own nation and with Europe were more likely to show ‘relative ingroup prototypicality’ (29% vs. 23% of the sample in Italy; 31% vs. 24% of the sample in Slovenia).

Table 3. Typology of ways to connect ingroup, outgroup and the European superordinate category by national and European identification (row %; Italy, Slovenia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inclusive common ingroup</th>
<th>Relative ingroup prototypicality</th>
<th>Relative outgroup prototypicality</th>
<th>Separate groups</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification (ITALY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and low with Europe</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and high with Europe</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High with nation and low with Europe</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High with nation and high with Europe</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification (SLOVENIA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and low with Europe</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and high with Europe</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 See the Appendix for methodological information about the indicators and scales used to measure the level of national and European identification.
In line with the theoretical framework illustrated above, dual identifiers could have positive or negative attitudes about inter-group relations based on different mechanisms used to connect the national to the European level (*re-categorisation* rather than *ingroup projection*). The data shown in Table 4 are consistent with this hypothesis: among dual identifiers the ‘inclusion common ingroup’ is very more likely to be associated with positive attitudes towards the outgroup than with ‘relative ingroup prototypicality’.

### Table 4 Attitudes towards the outgroup by typology of ways to connect ingroup, outgroup and the European superordinate category among dual identifiers (row %.;Italy and Slovenia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
<th>Ingroup Relative Prototypicality</th>
<th>Outgroup Relative prototypicality</th>
<th>Separate group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>High with nation and low with Europe</em></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>High with nation and high with Europe</em></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### How would you like that in the future would increase exchanges and contacts between Italy and Slovenia? (% of very)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very (Italy)</td>
<td>64,1</td>
<td>77,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very (Slovenia)</td>
<td>28,7</td>
<td>46,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### And in the future how much integration would that there was between Italians and Slovenians living in Italy? (% of a great deal more/ much more)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a great deal more/ much more (Italy)</td>
<td>52,5</td>
<td>36,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a great deal more/ much more (Slovenia)</td>
<td>47,8</td>
<td>58,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N (Italy)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (Slovenia)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2.1 Multivariate analysis

The analysis presented thus far has shown that identification with one’s own nation and Europe may conceal very different situations, according to whether individuals perceive all national groups as equally representative of the ‘we’ at European level, or whether, on the contrary, they transfer to the latter solely characteristics associated with their own national group. It has also been seen that these two different ways to connect the national and European levels (one based on the mechanism of *re-categorisation*, the other on that of *ingroup projection*) are also associated with opposite attitudes towards outgroup.

But what are the factors that explain the occurrence of one or the other model?

From the theoretical framework of IPM/CIIM it could be assumed that: 1) both mechanisms are associated with dual identification; 2) ingroup projection is triggered by a representation of the superordinate category based on similarities rather than internal differences (simple vs. complex representation).
With the purpose of controlling whether dual identity and type of representation of Europe has a effect on the activation of relative ingroup prototypicality and of inclusive common ingroup two separate binary logistic regression models were performed (Table 5/Table 6).

The dependent variable was the typology of ways to connect ingroup, outgroup and the European superordinate category shown in Table 2, coding as 1 the occurrence of ‘relative ingroup prototypicality’ and as 0 the absence of the event in the first model, coding as 1 the occurrence of ‘inclusive common ingroup’, and as 0 the absence of the event in the second model (Table 5 for Italy; Table 6 for Slovenia). The independent variables were dual identification and representation of Europe (simple vs. complex). Dual identification was measured by two different variables: the typology shown in Table 3 and the so-called ‘Moreno question’. In this way it was possible to control the influence of both the intensity of national and European belonging and of the relative importance attributed to it.

The controlling variables were level of education and age (to control the influence of ‘cognitive mobilization’), and political ideology (to control the influence of political identity).

Starting with the Italian case, the data presented in Table 5 allow comparison of the influence of specified variables on the risk of manifesting relative ingroup prototypicality or, conversely, inclusive common ingroup.

Firstly, on inserting the antecedent variables it can be confirmed that also in a ‘real’ world relative ingroup prototypicality (as IPM predicts) and inclusive common ingroup (as CIIM predicts) are associated, ceteris paribus, with dual identity. In fact, high identification with both the nation and Europe (compared with not having any identification at all) increases by 1.7 times the related risk of evincing relative ingroup prototypicality and even by 2.9 times the risk of inclusive common ingroup. But it should be noted that the same positive effect is found also with a high identification with Europe and a low one with the nation: the risk increases by 1.7 times of evincing relative ingroup prototypicality and by 0.8 times of evincing inclusive common ingroup (compared with not having any identification at all).

If both types are related to dual identity, very marked differences arise in regard to compatibility between national and European identity (Moreno question). On the one hand, the probability of showing relative ingroup prototypicality decreases according to the importance given to European belonging: compared with those respondents who felt only Italian, it decreases by 71% among those who felt more European than Italian (or only European) and by 37% among those who felt as much Italian as European (compared with feeling only Italian). By contrast, the probability of showing inclusive common ingroup increased by 73% among those respondents who felt as much Italian as European and by 66% among those who felt more Italian than European (compared with feeling only Italian).

As it said above, one of the hypotheses of IPM is that relative ingroup prototypicality is favoured with a representation of the superordinate European category which emphasises internal similarities rather than differences (simple vs. complex). The data confirm that the risk of evincing relative ingroup prototypicality increased by 63% among those respondents who had a simple representation of Europe (compared with a complex one). The effect, on the contrary, was null on activation of inclusive common ingroup.

Finally, focusing on level of education and age of interviews, to be noted is that these do not have any effect. Political ideology, instead, exerts an influence: the risk of evincing relative ingroup prototypicality decreased by 44% among respondents on the left/centre-left (compared with those who did not declare

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7 See the Appendix for methodological information about the indicators used to measure these two types of representation of Europe.
any ideology), while the risk of inclusive common ingroup decreased by 32% among those on the right/centre-right (compared with those did not declare any ideology; but the effect is neither very clear nor strong).

To summarise, in the Italian sample in order to trigger the ingroup projection, it seems necessary for Europe and the nation to be assessed positively, but also that loyalty towards one’s own nation is given priority over loyalty to Europe, and that a European prototype based on internal similarities has been internalised. This is a picture consistent with IPM. To activate the mechanism of re-categorisation, it is again necessary to assess both Europe and nation positively, but the data show that in this case the risk increases according more relevance to Europe rather than the nation. Furthermore, as expected, the representation of Europe does not have any effect.

Table 5. Binary logistic regression models to estimate the relative ingroup prototypicality and the inclusive common ingroup (Exp(β), 95% CI, Italy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative ingroup prototypicality (95% CI per EXP(β))</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive common ingroup (95% CI per EXP(β))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exp(β)</td>
<td>inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and low with Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and high with Europe</td>
<td>2.75***</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High with nation and low with Europe</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High with nation and high with Europe</td>
<td>2.77***</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You feel…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only national</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More national than European</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As much national as European</td>
<td>0.63*</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More European than national/ Only European</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex (internal differences)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple (internal similarities)</td>
<td>1.63***</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not choose</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right/centre-right</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/centre left</td>
<td>0.56**</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 35 years old</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-54 years old</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 years old</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 64 years old</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Slovenia, the situation appears slightly different (Table 6).

**Table 6. Binary logistic regression models to estimate the relative ingroup prototypicality and the inclusive common ingroup** (Exp(β), 95% CI, Slovenia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative Ingroup Prototypicality</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95% CI per EXP(β)</td>
<td>95% CI per EXP(β)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exp(β) inf sup</td>
<td>Exp(β) inf sup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.22 0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square of Nagelkerke</td>
<td>0.09 938</td>
<td>0.14 938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*reference category
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation and European Identification</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative Ingroup Prototypicality</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and low with Europe</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low with nation and high with Europe</td>
<td>2.29*** 1.36 3.89</td>
<td>3.88*** 2.31 6.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High with nation and low with Europe</td>
<td>2.22*** 1.29 3.84</td>
<td>0.88 0.46 1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High with nation and high with Europe</td>
<td>2.51*** 1.43 4.42</td>
<td>2.90*** 1.65 5.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>You feel...</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative Ingroup Prototypicality</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only nationala</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More national than European</td>
<td>0.82 0.52 1.29</td>
<td>1.75* 1.08 2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As much national as European</td>
<td>0.83 0.50 1.39</td>
<td>1.15 0.67 1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More European than national/ Only European</td>
<td>0.65 0.20 2.08</td>
<td>1.55 0.55 4.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation of Europe</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative Ingroup Prototypicality</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complexa (internal differences)</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple (internal similarities)</td>
<td>1.25 0.86 1.82</td>
<td>1.08 0.73 1.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political ideology</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative Ingroup Prototypicality</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does not choose</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right/centre-right</td>
<td>1.39 0.80 2.43</td>
<td>1.43 0.81 2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>1.62* 0.95 2.77</td>
<td>0.98 0.54 1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/centre-left</td>
<td>0.81 0.51 1.32</td>
<td>0.94 0.58 1.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative Ingroup Prototypicality</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lowa</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1.40 0.70 2.82</td>
<td>0.80 0.39 1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.33 0.63 2.80</td>
<td>1.13 0.53 2.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Relative Ingroup Prototypicality</th>
<th>Model to estimate the Inclusive Common Ingroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 35 years olda</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-54 years old</td>
<td>1.17 0.73 1.87</td>
<td>1.80** 1.11 2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 years old</td>
<td>1.50 0.78 2.89</td>
<td>1.33 0.65 2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 64</td>
<td>1.61* 0.92 2.85</td>
<td>2.00** 1.10 3.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One observes that, as expected, dual identification with the nation and Europe increases by 1.5 times (compared with not having any identification at all) the risk of showing relative ingroup prototypicality and by 1.9 times the risk of inclusive common ingroup. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in the Slovenian sample, every type of identification (compared with not having any at all) exerts a positive effect on ingroup projection. In the case of low identification with the nation and high with Europe, also the risk of inclusive common ingroup increases, even by 2.8 times (compared with not having any identification at all). This is the same positive effect that occurred in Italy. Furthermore, in Slovenia the effects on relative ingroup prototypicality and on inclusive common ingroup exerted by the relative importance of identities are not statistically significant.

Moreover, to be noted that, in Slovenia, the way in which interviewees represented Europe to themselves had no effect on the risk of revealing not only the inclusive common ingroup (as in Italy and in line with the theoretical framework), but also relative ingroup prototypicality.

Focusing on socio-demographic features, one observes that political ideology and level of education have no influence (as in Italy). Age does not affect the risk of relative ingroup prototypicality, but influences that of common ingroup prototypicality.

To make more evident the country differences and the influence of national/European identification and representation of Europe on the activation of ingroup projection, it is possible to modify odds ratios in absolute probabilities. Figures 1 and 2 show, respectively, the predicted (absolute) probabilities of relative ingroup prototypicality from logistic regression models for level of national and European identification and type of European representation.8

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8To compute predicted absolute probabilities, the variables in the model were fixed to the reference category, with the exception of identification and representation of Europe.
The Slovenian results seem to be only partially consistent with the IPM framework. As in the Italian case, it is confirmed that dual identity (national and European) can be associated with two different ways to connect the national and European level, but it is difficult to predict whether *ingroup projection* will be triggered rather than *re-categorisation*. In particular, the real difference in terms of the risk of *relative ingroup prototypicality* is made by those interviewees who identified themselves with any kind of territorial community and those who did not, and the representation of Europe did not have any effect.

Whether these country differences depend on the fact that the category of Europe, for Slovenian citizens, has not yet acquired a normative strength such to supply superordinate parameters with which to describe the own national group and the others, or on the fact that the hypotheses of the IPM are not to be generalised, cannot be determined from the data used. Further research making a larger number of comparisons between national ingroups/outgroups would be necessary for this purpose.

**Conclusion**

Although the debate about the relationship between national and European identity is still ongoing among scholars and policy-makers, survey data and social psychological experiments have confirmed that individuals can have multiple identities. Hence the question may not concern the conflict or the compatibility between national and European identity, but rather about the way in which national and European identities can co-exist with each other. What does ‘dual identity’ actually mean?

The answer to this question has drawn on two different conceptualizations: on the one hand, it has been hypothesised that identification with Europe also includes national identity (nested identities, as indicated with the metaphor of the Russian nested doll), one the other, it has been suggested that national and European identity can mix and influence each other (indicated with the metaphor of the marble cake). Metaphors aside, it is necessary to specify more precisely the ways in which individuals can connect the two levels and then test them empirically. The research reported in this paper has moved in this direction.

Applying the framework of IPM/CIIIM to survey data has made it possible to show that dual identification can conceal at least two different ways of connecting the national and European levels:

1. an ‘inclusive’ one, in which identification with national ingroup and a common European ingroup is associated to inclusion of all those seen as members of the same superordinate category;
2. an ‘exclusive’ one, in which Europe provides norms for comparisons between subordinate national ingroup and outgroup and members of a national group can discriminate outgroup, because they consider it a deviation from the ethnocentrically construed European prototype.

The first type signals the triggering of re-categorisation (the mechanism illustrated by the CIIM and which explains the reduction of discrimination towards the outgroup). This is a way of conceiving the relationship between national and European identity which is very widespread and frequently encouraged, especially by policy-makers. Europe is a multi-coloured mosaic of national cultures which are recognized as similar in the ‘common European home’. Instead, the second type is compatible with the mechanism of ingroup projection: i.e. that particular projection of distinctive features of the national ingroup onto the European category (to the disadvantage of other national groups).

To use a sporting metaphor, one might say that, for some dual identifiers, belonging to Europe is like an European football pitch on which it can be demonstrated that one’s national team is the most suitable to partecipate among those in the competition. And if the framework is such to induce the belief that a ‘European’ team must have specific characteristics, the spur to compete is greater. The idea of Europe thus becomes some sort of a stake in a game in which the citizens of the EU member countries mark out their mutual differences, although they acknowledge to themselves and others that they belong to one family.

Ingroup projection explains what is the mechanism, from a psychological perspective, that enables establishment of this particular connection between the national and European levels. The typology of ways to connect ingroup, outgroup and the European superordinate category propounded in this paper suggests an empirical survey measure.

The data presented have confirmed that, also in ‘real life’, both the two ways to connect ingroup, outgroup, European level are frequent among those who felt themselves to be both national and European. This raises interesting challenges for those engaged in comparative research on the complex relationship between national and European identity with respect to developing more reliable measurement instruments. Firstly, these results suggest that including national ingroup in the wider category of ‘Europe’ is only one of the aspects involved in the process of dual identification. Secondly, it is emphasised that the individual perception of double belongingness, national and European, is not a ‘fact’ but a ‘process’. Specifically, it is a ‘merging’ process where being European may be defined, from time to time, through comparison between national ingroup, outgroup, and inclusion in the superordinate category. The result of this process should not be taken for granted: for some individuals the resulting dual identity admits to the presence of diverse ways to be European – in principle as many as there are stars on the flag of the European Union. For other individuals, the resulting identity may be the result of ethnocentric projection of the specific characteristics of their own national group onto the superordinate entity. In addition, also their social consequences should not be taken for granted: the first type of dual identity is related to positive attitudes towards other national groups in Europe (as CIIM predicts), whereas for others it is related to negative ones (as IPM suggests). This effect is the reverse of the one usually assigned to the construction of a common European identity. Accordingly, empirical results presented confirm that the analysis of the relationship between national and European identity is challenging for political scientists both in terms of conceptualisation and measurement and in terms of “providing answers to the question of how the strategies of inclusion and exclusion as well as demarcation can be reconciled with democratic postulates of equality and freedom” (Kaina and Karolewski, 2013: 23).
However, it should be noted that the predictions of IPM (regarding the positive effect of dual identification and the simple representation of Europe) are confirmed only in the Italian case. Further research making a larger number of comparisons between national ingroups/outgroups would be necessary. Certainly, although the analysis carried out referred to only two countries, it signals that the functioning of psychological mechanisms, validated in experimental design, may vary according to the ‘real’ social and political context in which they develop. These results support the idea that importing the notion of European identity from social psychology is useful, but only with its appropriate theoretical adaptation (Duchesne, 2008; Huddy, 2001). National and European identities, in fact, are ‘political’ identities affected by social and political meanings. In this regard, it could be argued that *ingroup projection* is one of the ways in which people ‘fill’ with contents a category – in this case Europe – which is weakly defined (an ‘empty set’: Breakwell 2004). It also suggests, in this attribution of meanings, that dual identification (with the nation and with a superordinate category like Europe) can become a means to emphasise similarities (as CIIM predicts), but also to highlight differences among all the countries that take part in it (as IPM predicts). Politics can play a major role in this game. If it contributes to legitimating specific representations of Europe or presenting the nation and Europe as rivals, it can impact on a psychological mechanism, *ingroup projection*, thereby hindering the formation of dual identification of inclusive type.

**References**


Appendix – Indicators and scales

Typology of national and European identification

Scores on national and European identification scales were transformed via average split, producing two dichotomous variables (ingroup/superordinate high identification vs. low). These variables were crossed to produce a dual identification variable with four levels (see Table 3).

The following items were included in the scale of identification with the superordinate European category, rated on a 4-point Likert scale (1 ‘not at all’, 4 ‘very’):

1. Would you say that you feel European?
2. To what extent do you identify with Europeans?
3. Are you happy to be European?

Both European identification scales were sufficiently reliable (α= 0.88 in Italy and α= 0.82 in Slovenia). Mean of index was equal to 73 in Italy and 67 in Slovenia (scale 0-100).

National identification was measured by the following items, rated on 4-point Likert scale ( 1 ‘not at all’, 4 ‘very’):

1. When somebody speaks badly of Italian people (for the Italian sample)/Slovenian people (for the Slovenian sample), do you feel yourself involved?
2. Is being Italian (for the Italian sample)/Slovenian (for the Slovenian sample) an important aspect for you?

Both national identification scales were sufficiently reliable (α= 0.74 in Italy and α= 0.65 in Slovenia). Mean of index was equal to 84 in Italy and 67 in Slovenia (scale 0-100).

Representation of Europe

The level of consensus with the “simple” representation of Europe was measured by the following two items:

- Some people think that Europeans are very different, others think that the similarities are many. I am going to read a set of statements: please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of them.
  a) There is no typical European, but many types of Europeans (1 = very agree, 4 = very disagree);
  b) Diversity is one of the main features of Europe (1 = very agree, 4 = very disagree)

Internal variety seems to be, in the perception of the respondents, a distinctive feature of the "European" people. In fact, the share of respondents who said that they very much agreed with the first and the second statement was equal to, respectively, 67% and 60% in Italy and 53% and 45% in Slovenia.

Scale was sufficiently reliable (α= 0.69 in Slovenia; α= 0.60 in Italy). High values corresponded to the simple representation of Europe (mean = 15 in Italy; mean = 25 in Slovenia; scale 0-100). Scores were divided in tertiles. In the model shown in Table 5/6 a “simple” representation of Europe corresponds to the upper tertile.